The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) has stressed the importance of its national core technology list in preventing theft of trade secrets by foreign entities, particularly in light of concerns raised by a former U.S. Department of Commerce official regarding Taiwan’s export controls.
Mi-yong Kim, the former chair of the Operating Committee for Export Administration at the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), expressed reservations about a perceived discrepancy between Taiwan’s Foreign Trade Act and its list of “national core key technologies”, which was published in December last year. The inconsistency revolves around the fact that while the core technology list emphasizes the protection of “key technologies”, the Foreign Trade Act only oversees the flow of strategic high-tech “commodities” without explicit regulation on the export of “technologies”.
The list of 22 protected technologies, announced by the NSTC, encompasses five sectors: defense, space, agriculture, semiconductors, and information security. Specifically, with regard to semiconductors, the controlled technologies are those that are more advanced than the mature 14-nanometer process and advanced IC packaging and testing technologies, such as processes involving silicon photonics integration development and related specialty chemicals and raw materials and equipment.
In response to this concern, the NSTC emphasized that the list is designed to “strengthen the trade secrets of the national core technologies, preventing them from being disclosed illegally to foreign countries that could result in violations of national and industrial interests”. The council further stressed that the list does not impede existing commercial activities and collaborations of enterprises.
Regarding export control, it was clarified that Taiwan’s Foreign Trade Act does not necessitate a pre-export review or comprehensive implementation of technology export control as Kim asserted. Clarifying further, Kim highlighted Taiwan’s system governing technology export, noting that the Foreign Trade Act mainly applies export controls to commodities without specific focus on the regulation of technology exports.
Comparison to U.S. export control, which outlines ten broad categories with “technology” explicitly listed as a group, reinforces the concerns raised by those who argue that Taiwan should follow a similar approach in its export control list.
Jeremy Chih-cheng Chang, director of the semiconductor industrial policy research unit of the research institute for Democracy, Society and Energy Technology, echoed Kim’s view during a forum on the functionality of Taiwan’s regulatory system for the protection of technologies. He recognized that Taiwan’s National Security Act, the foundational law for the core technology list, is directed more towards strengthening legal actions against economic spies infringing private enterprises’ trade secrets rather than export control.
The sentiments expressed by Konrad Kwang-Leei Young, a former Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC) R&D director, highlighted a possible reluctance within the Taiwanese government to change the existing limited export control, given the perceived benefits to Taiwanese companies. There is a need for the government to balance the interests of companies with the broader objective of safeguarding national security.
Overall, the concerns raised by the ex-U.S. official have sparked a discussion about the efficacy of Taiwan’s export control regulations and the need to align them with best practices observed internationally for the protection of core technologies.